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Boris Nemtsov and the Reproduction of Regional Intelligentsia
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Abstract 
This essay attempts to situate Nemtsov as an individual in the broader sweep of Russia’s 
regional—and national—history.  To what extent is the democratic development of particular 
regions down to the force, drive, and charisma of particular transformational leaders?  And, 
to what extent is Nemtsov himself a product of the particular social milieu conducive to the 
genesis of the public-minded, self-sacrificing crusader for common good?  If regional 
microcosms matter for understanding the genesis of the democratic leader, what are those 
elements of the longue durée of regional cultural, social, economic, and political fabrics that 
might help explain the phenomenon of Nemtsov?  And how can Nemtsov’s own life help 
illuminate what aspects of regional histories we should study to explain the paradox of 
democratic resilience in particular regions and the potential of these regions to help transform 
national politics?  This essay attempts to provide some answers to these questions by 
discussing the historical origins of, and the puzzle of inter-temporal, political regime-
transcending reproduction of, human capital variations in Russia’s regions, and specifically 
those related to the development of institutions of learning and science. 
  
                                                 
1
 A short version of this essay appeared as a LSE European Politics and Public Policy blogpost (Lankina 2015). 
Available at: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/03/02/russian-citizens-owe-it-to-boris-nemtsov-to-keep-the-
hope-of-democracy-in-russia-alive/ 
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Introduction 
I first heard of Boris Nemtsov when I was a young Russian graduate student in America in 
the mid-1990s contemplating pursuing a PhD in Russian regional politics.  For a new, post-
Kremlinologist, generation of political scientists it was the phenomenon of leaders like 
Nemtsov that made the study of Russian provincial politics fascinating and exciting.  In post-
Soviet hyper-federalist Russia of the early years of the Boris Yel’tsin presidency, sub-
national regions quickly emerged as powerful players in their own right, shaping regional and 
national politics. As a governor of Nizhniy Novgorod region, still only in his early thirties (he 
was only thirty two when he became governor), Nemtsov was already a star—well before he 
entered national politics as Deputy Prime Minister.  Nemtsov led the democratic 
transformation of the Nizhniy Novgorod region, nurturing an atmosphere of political 
openness, attracting foreign investment, and supporting independent media and civil society.  
To scholars of Russian regional politics, Nemtsov’s governorship of Nizhegorodskaya is 
associated with the most vibrant period in the history of Russian federalism. I hesitate to use 
the expression “golden age” of federalism because the Yel’tsin-era federal relations were 
associated with ad hocism and preferential politically-motivated deals with regional bosses 
that in some cases helped promote regional authoritarianism, nepotism, and corruption.  Yet, 
regions like Nizhniy stood out as islands of sub-national openness, while governors like 
Nemtsov helped keep in check excessive concentration of power in the national executive 
and shaped national policy and public opinion. (In 1996, he organised a signature campaign 
against the war in Chechnya, collecting one million signatures in the Nizhniy Novgorod 
region on a petition to President Yel’tsin and calling on other regions to support his initiative) 
(McFaul and Petrov 1998, p. 698).  President Vladimir Putin’s recentralisation drive of the 
early 2000s ensured that even the hitherto politically open regions would turn into 
dependencies of the Kremlin delivering blatantly fraudulent electoral support to the national 
incumbent (Lankina and Skovoroda 2015).  Back in the 1990s however, the more politically 
competitive regions could, and did, shape national political landscapes.  While the 
Rakhimovs, the Shaymievs, or the Ilyumdzhinovs—long-serving presidents of 
Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, and Kalmykia of that era will be associated in the public mind with 
patrimonialism and neo-Soviet sub-national authoritarianism (Kahn 2002; Lankina 2004), 
Nemtsov will be remembered as a democratic, public-minded, governor. 
 This essay attempts to situate Nemtsov as an individual in the broader sweep of 
Russia’s regional—and national—history.  To what extent is the democratic development of 
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particular regions down to the force, drive, and charisma of particular transformational 
leaders?  And, to what extent is Nemtsov himself a product of the particular social milieu 
conducive to the genesis of the public-minded, self-sacrificing crusader for common good?  If 
regional microcosms matter for understanding the genesis of the democratic leader, what are 
those elements of the longue durée of regional cultural, social, economic, and political fabrics 
that might help explain the phenomenon of Nemtsov?  And how can Nemtsov’s own life help 
illuminate what aspects of regional histories we should study to explain the paradox of 
democratic resilience in particular regions and the potential of these regions to help transform 
national politics?  This essay attempts to provide some answers to these questions. At the 
outset, I should say that I have never met Boris Yefimovich, nor am I familiar with all the 
known details of his biography.  I am approaching this topic as a political scientist 
specialising on Russia’s regional politics and as someone who had come to realise that to 
understand the post-1991 dynamics of regional political development we have to go beyond 
the preoccupation with the political leadership choices made in the post-communist period, 
and beyond even the structural variations imposed on the regions during the Soviet period. 
Rather, we should delve deeper into history, to explore how pre-communist developments 
may have already set regions on variable developmental and, ultimately, democratic 
trajectories; how these developments interacted with Soviet developmental goals and 
projects; and how these complex historical processes in turn continue to account for Russia’s 
regional governance variations.  Rather than emphasizing political and economic institutions 
as being central to the long-term reproduction of patterns of development, as would be 
consistent with a prominent strand of recent economic and political theorizing (Acemoglu, 
Johnson et al. 2001), my approach is leaning more towards the human capital persistence and 
reproduction area of recent and established scholarship in economics, sociology, and political 
science (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990; Glaeser, Porta et al. 2004). Taking this approach 
endows our hero both with a strong agency—and power to shape regional (and national) 
destinies—while also highlighting how the genesis of the particular values, the mind-set, and 
actions that we associate with one particular individual is perhaps more likely in particular 
regional settings, and less so, in others.  In what follows, I begin by outlining the historical 
elements of regional development that ought to be considered as important drivers of the 
reproduction of the observed variations in regional governance over time.  I then situate the 
phenomenon of Boris Nemtsov in the particular constellations of regional variables 
propitious for nurturing non-conformist opinion—, notably the development of Nizhniy’s 
centres of scientific research in which he studied and worked—, while also highlighting the 
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democratic proclivities of the Yaroslavl’ region, in which Nemtsov was elected as regional 
assembly deputy in 2013. A concluding section links the historical discussion about regional 
human capital to the wider debates about the role of the critical intelligentsia in keeping the 
hope of democracy in Russia alive. 
  
The Longue Durée of Regional Histories     
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, it did not take long for scholars to observe that 
the substantial democratic variations that emerged early on among Soviet-block states, are 
also characteristics of Russia’s sub-national regions (Gelman, Ryzhenkov et al. 2003; 
Lankina 2015; Lankina, Libman et al. 2016; Lankina and Voznaya 2015; Lankina 2004; 
McMann and Petrov 2000).  In fact, it was the persona of the media darling Boris Nemtsov—
the young governor who shaped the democratic politics of the Nizhniy Novgorod region—
that made these variations appear to be ever more glaring. The democratic politics of 
Nizhegorodskaya under Nemtsov’s governorship—however messy and scandal-ridden 
(McFaul and Petrov 1998)—nevertheless stood in stark contrast to the neo-Soviet, 
patrimonial, and corrupt regimes in the “ethnic” republics of Bashkortostan or Kalmykia; or 
to the conservative, nostalgic-Soviet, paternalistic politics in what quickly became known as 
the “Red belt,” “Russian”—that is, non-ethnically defined—oblasti.  The ground-breaking 
indices of regional democracy composed by the Scholars Nikolay Petrov, Alexey Titkov 
codified—in an innovative and highly systematic way—what was becoming known 
anecdotally about the democratic or authoritarian proclivities of particular regions (Petrov 
2005; Petrov and Titkov 2013).  Nizhny already emerged in these indices close to the very 
top end of Russia’s regional democratic achievers.  The 1990s was the height of the 
dominance of transitology as the leading explanatory paradigm accounting for the emerging 
democratic variations among post-Soviet states.  Scholarship on Russia’s regions influenced 
by the transitology paradigm tended to explain the emerging variations in regional 
governance in terms of pacts and choices made among key individuals in regional leadership 
positions (Gelman, Ryzhenkov et al. 2003).  Others, however, were early on pointing to the 
significant Soviet-era structural legacies that may account for the particular regional elite 
constellations and the choices that these elites make in the context of democratic transition 
(Stoner-Weiss 1997). Again, Nizhniy Novgorod featured in some of these analyses as a 
region in which the Soviet-era industrial structure made consensual-style, democratic, politics 
more likely than in those regions where such Soviet-imposed structural preconditions had 
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been lacking.  More recent scholarship on post-communist democracy and development has 
encouraged scholars to transcend their preoccupation with “temporally shallow”(Kitschelt 
2003) causes and to more systematically explore how pre-communist histories might have a 
bearing on the long-term reproduction of variables that could be linked to spatial variations in 
democratic governance (Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006; Kotkin and Beissinger 2014; T. 
Lankina 2012; Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2013).  Much of this literature has tended to analyse 
national-level variations (but see (T. Lankina 2012)).  Furthermore, recent research into the 
long-term influences of pre-communist legacies on post-communist democracy has mostly 
focused on Central Europe’s states. Russia has been curiously side-lined in this work, at best 
featuring as an observation in large-n national-level, quantitative, analyses. 
 Barring a handful of recent studies by economic historians into particular aspects of 
regional development, such as serfdom (Finkel, Gehlbach et al. 2015), or the zemstvo 
movement (Nafziger 2011), there has been little systematic sub-national scholarship on how 
the pre-communist development of Russia’s provinces could help us explain democratic—or 
autocratic—resilience in the regions.  Research to date has tended to concentrate on a handful 
of regions; or to explore causal mechanisms contained within a particular historical era.
2
  
There is an even greater paucity of research into how regional pre-communist histories may 
have interacted with the communist project, and how the complex multi-layered historical 
processed might in turn shed light on the developmental trajectories of particular regions. 
 The specific feature of Russia’s regional development that I would like to highlight 
here is the inter-temporal resilience of human capital—and the institutions associated with the 
production and reproduction of human and cultural capital—transcending the distinct tsarist, 
communist, and post-communist periods and regime types. Already in the early 19
th
 century, 
some regions of the Russian Empire that are now part of the Russian Federation possessed 
the beginnings of what would become some of the Empire’s more advanced schooling 
systems.  In the course of the 19
th
 century, universities were also established in several of the 
gubernii corresponding to the territories of the present-day Russian Federation.  These 
institutions were of course the manifestations of wider modernization processes in tsarist 
Russia, which affected the various territories in a highly uneven fashion. These 
modernization variations had been conditioned by a complex bundle of variables ranging 
from the differences in the practices associated with peasant bondage; to geographic location 
in proximity to key transport arteries; to the discovery of important natural resources and 
                                                 
2
 Such as whether serfdom had the effect of deterring peasant rebellion in imperial Russia (Finkel et al. 2015).  
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concomitant processes of industrialisation in particular gubernii (Brooks 1985; Eklof 1986; 
Leonard 2011; Moon 2002; Nafziger 2011; Treadgold 1976).  They were also conditioned by 
exogenous factors preceding industrialisation, as would be the case with German settlers who 
had been invited by Catherine the Great to settle in the Volga area (povolzhye), and later 
settled also in Siberia, beginning in the 18
th
 century (Kabuzan 2003; Keim 2006; Koch 1977; 
T. V. Lankina 2012; Schippan and Striegnitz 1992; Stricker 1994). These German 
communities founded superb primary schools and gymnasia, while also providing the human 
capital pool for the nascent university system (as did other ethnic Germans, who had not been 
descendants of the settlers, but who had come to colonise Russia’s higher educational and 
research establishments as scholars and who are given credit for the Germanization of the 
Empire’s University system and research (Graham 1967). When reading the novelist Fyodor 
Dostoevsky’s The House of the Dead3; or the explorer George Kennan’s powerful Siberia 
and the Exile System, one is also reminded of the role of political exiles in creating small 
groups of cosmopolitan and highly educated communities—some transient, others leaving a 
profound mark on the local social-cultural milieu—in the most climatically harsh and 
undeveloped fringes of the Russian Empire (Dostoevsky 1982; Kennan 1891). Consequently, 
as is illustrated by the results of the first Imperial Census of 1897, at the turn of the 19
th
-20
th
 
centuries, on the eve of the Bolshevik revolution, Russia featured glaring spatial variations in 
literacy levels among its provinces. Furthermore, while some gubernii were only beginning to 
develop universal basic schooling, others already possessed world-class institutions of 
learning and research.  
 To illustrate these patterns, I provide some statistics on literacy in imperial Russia’s 
gubernii and indicate where the more or less literate provinces ended up on regional 
democracy indices in the 1990s and early 2000s (Appendix, Table 1). (For a detailed 
discussion of these patterns and presentation of the relevant data, see Lankina, Libman et al. 
2016). The literacy statistics are sourced from Russia’s first imperial census of 1897 
(Troynitskiy 1905), while the regional democracy data are compiled by Petrov and Titkov 
(2013). In developmental scholarship, female literacy in particular is considered to be an 
important indicator of human capital and modernization considering the significance of 
                                                 
3
 Thus, in The House of the Dead (Zapiski iz myortvogo doma) Dostoevsky’s character narrating the story 
writes: “V sibirskikh gorodakh chasto vstrechayutsya uchitelya iz ssyl’nykh pereselntsev; imi ne brezgayut. 
Uchat zhe oni preimushchestvenno frantsuzskomu yazyku, stol’ neobkhodimomu na poprishche zhizni i o 
kotorom bez nikh v otdalyonnykh krayakh Sibiri ne imeli by i ponyatiya” (“In Siberian towns one often meets 
teachers from amongst the exiled settlers; the local citizens are not squeamish [towards these people].  They 
mostly teach the French language, so important in life, and without them [these teachers] about which [French 
language] in the distant parts of Siberia one would not have any idea” (translated by author, p. 6). 
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literacy and education for female participation in the labour force, reproductive decisions, and 
the likelihood of transmission of values conducive to educational aspirations to children 
(Lankina and Getachew 2013).  Unsurprisingly, we observe that regions that had been most 
literate and ended up with comparatively high democracy scores (Petrov and Titkov 2013) 
are Moscow (56.3 overall literacy and 42.3 female literacy) and St. Petersburg (62.6 overall 
literacy and 51.5 female literacy).  What is less known however is that, for instance, Samara 
and Yaroslavl’, which had been considered among Russia’s most politically open regions in 
the post-communist period, also had among the highest literacy levels and particularly female 
literacy, in the imperial period (22.1 and 14 percent; and 36 and 24 percent, respectively).  In 
territories that had been during the imperial period part of what constitutes the present-day 
Nizhegorodskaya oblast, the overall literacy rate was 22 percent and female literacy was 11 
percent. These figures are modest if one compares Russia to Western European states with far 
higher literacy levels at the turn of the 19
th
-early 20
th
 centuries, yet they are significantly 
above literacy rates in a large number of imperial Russia’s other gubernii. 
 Now let us look at regions that had been among the least literate in the imperial 
period, in terms of both overall literacy and female literacy.  The North Caucasus republics 
clearly stand out—with literacy of less than 15 percent and with only 6 percent females listed 
as literate in some regions (Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia)—, though among the less 
literate regions one also finds the Siberian territories like Omsk and Novosibirsk that 
remained comparatively under-developed at the time of the 1897 census when it comes to 
overall levels of human capital (as distinct from the educational credentials of the small 
communities of exiles or tsarist administrators), but have been considered comparatively 
democratic in the post-communist period.  What is also interesting is that Central Russian 
regions that in terms of their post-communist electoral geography had been characterised as 
belonging to the “red belt” of conservative regions with paternalistic political tendencies also 
had at the time of the 1897 census low levels of literacy, female literacy in particular.  For 
instance, in Orel, the overall and female literacy rates were 17.6 and 7.3 percent, respectively.  
In the “red belt” region of Briansk, overall literacy was 16.6 and female literacy was only 6.9 
percent. 
 Clearly, not all regions fit the pattern of high imperial literacy-high post-communist 
democracy, considering that a host of potential variables may impinge on regional democratic 
development.  Nevertheless, systematic statistical analysis of the links between human capital 
and regional democratic variations suggests (Lankina, Libman et al. 2016) that the above-
discussed patterns are non-random, in other words, that past literacy does have an effect on 
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subsequent communist-era modernization, as well as on post-communist regional regime 
patterns. 
 The spatial variations in human capital were to pose significant challenges to the 
rulers of the new Bolshevik state who were desperate to not only stamp out illiteracy and 
develop more advanced forms of education throughout the country, but to find sufficiently 
qualified cadre—the so-called red teachers (krasnye uchitelya)—to assist the Bolsheviks in 
the attainment of these noble objectives (Varlamenkov 2008).  They also complicated the 
pursuit of the overall objective of the country’s rapid modernization.  
 The underlying assumption in some of the scholarship on Soviet regional 
development has been that the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 put a break on the reproduction 
of the above-discussed developmental—and, most importantly for this analysis, human 
capital,—variations under the new order; and that the regional variations that we observe now 
are products of the spatially uneven application of the USSR’s industrialisation drive 
(Fainsod 1970). In fact, much of the earlier scholarship on communist-period regional 
development has tended to emphasise Soviet accomplishments in eliminating illiteracy, in 
building higher education, and in abolishing, or at least significantly reducing, the massive 
social inequalities that existed in the Tsarist period.  
 Thus, the claim of the creation of a New Soviet Man had been in some ways 
unreflectively internalised by scholars writing about Soviet modernization accomplishments.  
So has been apparently the notion that a new Soviet intelligentsia had been created, that is, an 
intelligentsia ostensibly untarnished by association with the old intelligentsia of educated or 
more or less privileged origin from the previous, tsarist order (Fainsod 1970; Rigby 1990; De 
Witt 1961). Yet, the undisputable record of social elevation of large numbers of hitherto 
underprivileged and uneducated members of the lower orders—and their metamorphosis into 
the new intelligentsia—has often tended to obscure the immense role of the literate, better-
educated, and often (though not always) relatively privileged members of the old 
intelligentsia in this process, and of the corresponding eventual acquisition of respectable 
status of this old intelligentsia and their descendants under the Soviet regime. 
 The Soviets in fact built on the tsarist regime’s modernization foundations, employing 
the educated strata of the past order to further their grand social engineering and economic 
modernization projects (Lankina, Libman et al. 2016). The historical narratives about 
Bolshevik rule are littered with images of vandalism and destruction—of palaces, churches, 
and mansions. Yet, one story that features less prominently in these narratives is about the 
scores of institutions manufacturing human capital that the Bolsheviks unashamedly 
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appropriated, preserved, patched up, and expanded to serve the regime’s ambitious 
developmental objectives. It is little surprise then that territories corresponding to imperial 
gubernii with high concentrations of institutions of basic and advanced learning, or otherwise 
boasting high human capital development due to the long-term imperial-era modernization 
processes, also emerged as hubs of scientific endeavour and advanced industry in the 
communist period.  So did those with perhaps more modest claim to being at the forefront of 
imperial education and scholarship—for instance, Ivanovo—but which due to the exogenous 
shock of war (First World War during the Imperial period; and Secord World War during the 
Soviet period) ended up playing host, at first temporarily, and then permanently, to leading 
centres of learning or industry that had been evacuated from other regions for strategic 
reasons (Lankina, Libman et al. 2016).   
 Populating these institutions were real people, whose motivations for serving the 
communist regime were complex, but who played significant roles in the USSR’s 
modernization endeavour.  Until the Stalinist purges of the 1930s, available records allow us 
with some degree of certainty to establish the extent of reproduction of generally the literate 
strata and indeed the intellectual crème de la crème of the imperial academic establishments 
in the institutions or learning, scientific, and cultural endeavour under the Bolshevik regime.  
For instance, we know that a significant proportion of gymnasia teachers, as indeed 
academicians in such top imperial-era establishments like the Russian Academy of Sciences 
in St. Petersburg, had previously worked in those imperial academic institutions and had been 
appropriated by the new regime to advance literacy, higher education, or science (Graham 
1967; Varlamenkov 2008).  The purges of course had an enormous toll on these educated 
strata of Soviet society (Conquest 2008; Ellman 2002; Rosefielde 1997).  Not only did the 
purges represent the physical extermination of hundreds of thousands of innocent citizens, 
but they also displaced and uprooted scores of others. Yet, statistics compiled by T. H. Rigby 
provide some indication as to the degree of what may be termed post-purge “restoration” of 
individuals with “undesirable” social origins in party and governance structures and in 
professional occupations (Rigby 1968). For instance, the high proportion of “scientists” 
among post-purge, 1938-1939, party recruits suggests that many would have obtained their 
education under the old order—this would be in line with the policy of abandonment of rigid 
class-based criteria in admission to the party, and in advancement in the professions, by the 
late 1930s (Rigby 1968, p. 222). Analysing the imperial backgrounds of Soviet academics, 
the Russian historian Sergey Vokov notes: “The scientific milieu … corresponded the least to 
the Soviet understandings of ‘correct’ social origins”; this observation applied in particular to 
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“physics, mathematics, and medicine” (author translation from the Russian language).4  
Generally, some indication of the inter-generational reproduction of educational status, 
values, and preferences is provided by Sheila Fitzpatrick, Alex Inkeles and other leading 
scholars of Soviet politics, who documented the impetus of those who had been well-
educated in the imperial era to transmit educational advantage to their offspring—even if—, 
under the new order—, in new form, name, and substance (Fitzpatrick 1979; Inkeles 1950; 
Lane 1973). The result had been a considerable degree of reproduction of social and 
professional identifications—with a corresponding set of value orientations—between two 
apparently vastly contrasting imperial and communist regimes (Volkov 1999). 
 In a recent paper, Tomila Lankina, Alexander Libman, and Anastassia Obydenkova 
(2016), conceptualise the above-discussed social repositioning of the imperial regime’s 
educated strata under the new communist regime as a form of appropriation.  Whether these 
individuals and their descendants became genuine converts to Marxist-Leninist faith, or 
simply professed enthusiasm for the new regime to get on with their lives and careers, many 
ended up joining the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In fact, as a large body 
of sovietological scholarship testifies, the educated, upwardly mobile strata tended to be over-
represented in the CPSU in proportion to the share of these groups in the USSR’s population 
(Djilas 1983; Rigby 1968).  Some public opinion surveys conducted in the post-soviet period 
(and in various other post-communist states) suggest that, contrary to expectations of 
modernization theorizing, the highly educated former communist party members ended up 
espousing values less democratic than those who had never been party members during the 
communist period (Dalton 1994; Finifter and Mickiewicz 1992; Miller, Hesli et al. 1997; 
Rohrschneider 1994). These data might indicate that there was something about socialization 
within the party that had an undemocratic effect on value orientations; it may also point to the 
undemocratic effects of service to the communist regime more generally insofar as party 
membership may proxy for involvement with the political-managerial and governance side of 
Soviet professions (Libman and Obydenkova 2013, 2015).  Paradoxically, those very same 
areas of present-day Russia that had been rich in human capital—and democratic potential—
before the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, ended up becoming the more robust suppliers of 
educated party cadre; this in turn, as Lankina, Libman, and Obydenkova conjecture (2016), 
would have a subversive effect on the democratic trajectories of particular regions in the post-
communist period. 
                                                 
4
 He writes: “Nauchnaya sreda iz vsekh professional’nykh grupp intellektual’nogo sloya, po-vidimomu, v 
naimen’shey stepeni otvechala sovetskim predstavleniyam o ‘pravil’nom’ sotsial’nom sostave.” 
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 So, if the appropriation and subversion thesis is correct, how, then, do we begin to 
explain why not all educated strata engaged in regime-reinforcing ideological dogma and 
professions?  And what kind of a regional milieu would have been least conducive to the 
processes of democratic subversion-through-service discussed above?  To address this 
question, I turn again to T.H. Rigby (1968; 1990), whose work has been rather unjustly 
neglected in recent scholarship on the historical legacies of communism, but who provides 
the in my view still unsurpassed analysis of the professional, demographic, and social 
characteristics of the members of CPSU over time. As noted above, the highly educated 
professionals had been drawn to the party.  Academia and research were not immune to this 
trend insofar as many academics and scientists represented the party’s “lay” membership—
uninvolved with the party apparat, but possessing membership cards, usually for the purposes 
of career advancement.  Specific branches of scholarship however stood out in their 
comparatively low statistics for membership in the USSR’s “leading and guiding force.”  It is 
well-known that the hard sciences in particular had served as breeding grounds for the 
USSR’s dissident movement. Rigby’s statistics confirm that certain branches of scholarly 
endeavour had been indeed comparatively low party-saturated.  The party records data that he 
cites are for the late 1940s, but they provide some illustration of what continued to represent 
a trend in party membership rates among scientists over time. For instance, while in 1947, a 
mere 17 percent of engineering professors were CPSU members, 58 professors in the social 
sciences and philosophy possessed CPSU membership cards (Rigby 1968, p. 445).  
 Here, as the sociologist Georgi Derluguian notes, an element of self-selection is likely 
to have been at work, as those most critically-inclined towards the regime had been perhaps 
more likely to join the least-ideologically indoctrinated professions (Derluguian 2005, p. 
110). Rigby also speculates that “first-rate” scientists valued by the regime for their 
contribution to the USSR’s stellar achievements had been perhaps also comparatively 
immune from the pressures of membership—and the administrative burdens that come with 
ritualised regime-reinforcing “public” activities associated with being a Komsomol or party 
member (Rigby 1968, p. 446). Finally, the Russian historian Sergei Volkov highlights the 
element of the inter-generational reproduction of a particular mind-set amongst descendants 
of pre-Soviet academic intelligentsia that continued to discreetly hold on to their values while 
labouring in scientific environments far removed from the “ideological vanguard of 
communist construction.”  He writes:  
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Despite the artificial nature of the soviet intellectual strata in general, in its midst had 
been preserved, or even newly formed, isolated strata and groups qualitatively 
different—and better—than the rest…  I mean first and foremost the academic milieu 
and the sphere of military-technical research and development.  In a number of the 
branches of these spheres, as is well-known, can be found the intellectual potential of 
world quality, at least in a professional sense.  Having found themselves for a variety of 
reasons… outside of the sphere of rigid ideological control, these strata had partially 
succeeded in conserving the features characteristic of the normal intellectual elite.  It is 
also characterised by a comparatively high level of self-reproduction.  This is also the 
strata that had partially succeeded in preserving certain traditions of the pre-soviet 
intellectual layer of society.
5
   
 
I conjecture that the social milieu propitious for democracy in post-communist Russia would 
be one situated around the kinds of islands of non-conformism discussed above, which would 
be in turn conditioned by the long-term historical legacies of development in particular 
regions; these islands would be also most immune to the pressures of communist-era 
appropriation that may have been more strongly felt by other comparatively well-developed 
areas. These would be also the kinds of spatial islands of critical thought and opinion that 
would generate support structures for Russia’s post-communist democratic movement.  In the 
next section, I illustrate the various insights that I have sketched out above, about the 
temporal, spatial, and social dimension of the reproduction of imperial and communist 
legacies, based on the example of the Nizhniy Novgorod region, while also briefly 
highlighting the conditions similarly propitious for democratic resilience in the Yaroslavl’ 
region, where Nemtsov performed his final formal political role as deputy to the regional 
legislature.  
 
                                                 
5
 The original Russian text reads: “Nesmotrya na protivoestestvennyy kharakter sovetskogo intellektual’nogo 
sloya v tselom, v ego sostave sokhranilis’ ili dazhe sforminovalis’ otdel’nye sloi i gruppy, otlichayushchiesya v 
luchshuyu storonu kachestvom nekotorykh svoikh chlenov.  Rech idyot v pervuyu ochered’ ob akademicheskoy 
srede i sfere voenno-tekhnicheskikh razrabotok. V ryade ikh otrasley sosredotochen, kak izvestno, 
intellektual’nyy potentsial, ne ustupayushchiy zarubezhnomu urovnyu po krayney mere v professional’nom 
plane. Okazavshis’ po raznym prichinam… vne sfery zhyostkogo ideologicheskogo kontrolya, eta sreda sumela 
otchasti sokhranit’ cherty, svoystvennye normal’noy intellektual’noy elite. Ona otlichayetsya i dostatochno 
vysokim urovnem samovosproizvodstva. Ona zhe otchasti sokhranila dazhe nekotorye traditsii dosovetskogo 
intellektual’nogo sloya.”  
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The Nizhniy Novgorod Region and Boris Nemtsov   
 
Territories of what is now the Nizhniy Novgorod region had been in the XIV century part of 
the independent Nizhegorodsko-Suzdal’skoe Principality.  Located at the intersection of the 
Volga and Oka river Basins and key transport arteries linking central Russia with Urals and 
Siberia, the Nizhniy Novgorod City by the 19
th
 century emerged as a leading centre of trade 
and commerce. From 1817, it played host to Russia’s largest Makaryevskaya Trade Fair. In 
the Soviet period, Nizhniy Novgorod became a “hyper-industrial” region, surpassed only by 
the City of Moscow and the Moscow and Sverdlovsk oblasti in industrial production levels.  
While the region is well-known for its machine-building industries, a third of its industrial 
production during the Soviet period had been in the defence sector. The Nizhniy Novgorod 
region had been off-limits to foreigners during the Soviet period because it housed the highly 
secretive “numbered” towns like Arzamas-16 (Sarov), which abandoned its closed status only 
in 1995.  As had been the case with the USSR’s other hubs that serviced the military-
industrial complex, the Nizhniy Novgorod region became a leading centre of scientific 
research.  By the time of the USSR’s collapse, scientific research, education and services 
related to knowledge-production (along with culture and the arts) constituted the second 
largest area of employment in the oblast.
6
   
 The Lobachevsky State University, in which Nemtsov studied, started its life as the 
Warsaw Polytechnic Institute named after Nicholas II. It had been founded in 1898 and was 
among Imperial Russia’s leading scientific establishments. Like the Ivanovo Polytechnic in 
the Ivanovo region (which ended up hosting the Riga Polytechnic Institute), the university 
had been evacuated to the region during the First World War. In 1916, it became Nizhniy 
Novgorod’s “People’s University.” Although the Institute had been an acquisition from 
Imperial Russia’s more advanced territories, the choice of Nizhniy as its new home had been 
influenced by a sustained campaign of the guberniya residents to raise funds for the 
relocation of the Institute’s staff and facilities to their region.  Here, the tradition of 
metsenatstvo (philanthropy) in this historically trading region played a role as Nizhniy’s 
leading industrialists pooled funds to ensure that the project would be viable. The presence of 
relatively developed educational infrastructure and human capital pool, which would be 
leveraged during the early days of the polytechnic’s relocation, also played a role in the 
selection of Nizhniy as the Institute’s new home. When the Bolsheviks came to power, the 
                                                 
6
 This paragraph is based on: 
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Institute became the Nizhegorodsky Polytechnic Institute. In 1956, it was named after the 
feted Soviet mathematician Nikolay Lobachevsky.
7
     
 The academic institution which Boris Nemtsov joined as a student; and the Radio-
physics Research Institute in which he subsequently worked as a scientist, would have been 
microcosms of the liberal hard sciences milieu that, as noted above, had been propitious to 
the nurturing of unconventional values and thought. These institutions would have been 
beneficiaries of the Bolshevik regime’s privileged treatment of the sciences that had been 
introduced from the outset of Soviet rule.  As early as 1921, a Central Commission for the 
Improvement of the Livelihoods of Scientists was created, which provided, inter alia, for 
special akademicheskie payki (academic supplements); financial incentives in the form of 
premiums for academic publications and inventions had been also introduced.  The greatest 
generosity had been shown towards those working in the “hard” sciences.  A special 1921 
decree essentially put scientists on a par with “workers” in status, which implied that they 
would not face discrimination due to their “undesirable,” bourgeois origins; this also implied 
that these individuals and their offspring would not face discrimination in university 
admissions (or even that they would get the same preferential treatment as those ascribed a 
“worker” category).8 In-depth studies of the bureaucratic politics of the USSR’s leading 
scientific institutions—and example of which would be Loren Graham’s study of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg—highlight how they remained oases for the 
reproduction of scientific—and cultural—capital inherited from the imperial era, despite the 
pressures they faced in the form of the introduction of monitoring and supervision by 
mediocre party appratchiki. Derluguian (2005, p. 110) provides an illustration of how 
communities of the liberal-minded would have been nurtured in institutions like the 
Lobachevsky University and the Radio-physics Research Institute even in the later decades of 
the Soviet period. The “hard” sciences represented, he writes, “the main breeding ground for 
liberal dissidents, . . . especially the advanced fields of nuclear research and space 
exploration. During the 1950s and 1970s, these scholarly communities [along with other 
professions like linguists] enjoyed privileged funding, exceptionally high public acclaim, and 
relatively unrestricted intellectual exchanges with their Western colleagues.”  The pursuit of 
such “obscure interests… beyond the focus of official Marxist-Leninist ideology… helped to 
                                                 
7
 http://www.unn.ru/general/brief.html; http://www.nntu.ru/content/istoriya (accessed 5 July 2015). 
8
 Mervin Matthews, “Stanovlenie sistemy privilegiy v Sovetskom gosudarstve,” Skepsis  
http://scepsis.net/library/id_439.html; original publication in Voprosy istorii, 1992, № 2-3, pp. 45-61 
http://scepsis.net/library/id_439.html (accessed 30 June 2015). 
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foster cohesive communities with a sense of professional dignity and kinship with the 
intellectual community outside the USSR.  It is no small matter that such disciplines normally 
required a familiarity with esoteric concepts and at least a basic knowledge of foreign 
languages, which tended to deter administrative careerists” (Derluguian 2005, pp. 110-111, 
cited in Lankina, Obydenkova and Libman, 2016). 
 The presence of a large community of intelligentsia, continuously nurtured in 
Nizhniy’s centres of learning and research, provided important foundations for Nizhniy’s 
perestroika-era democratic politics. As elsewhere in the Soviet Union, the origins of the 
region’s politically-transformative societal activism could be traced to the environmental 
movement, which often featured the scientific intelligentsia as activists, and it is not 
coincidental that Nemtsov’s political career began in Nizhniy’s environmental campaigns of 
the 1980s.  It is also not coincidental that in this region, a democratic politician like Nemtsov 
stood a chance of resisting and checking the power of the former communist nomenklatura. 
A study that ranked Russia’s regions according to the degree of their involvement in EU-
funded projects in the 1990s found Nizhniy Novgorod—a region formerly featuring cities 
that had been closed to foreigners—to be one of the most active regional participants in 
initiatives that involved EU-Russia civil society development and other democracy-
promotion projects (Lankina 2005; Lankina and Getachew 2006, 2008). Nemtsov’s sheer 
drive, determination, and charisma during his governorship had been undoubtedly 
instrumental in creating the policy windows for investment and public and private projects 
with external partners in the region. Yet, he also operated in a regional environment with the 
cultural, intellectual, and human capital that would make such politics and policies possible.     
 Nemtsov’s subsequent career outside of Nizhniy Novgorod further supports the 
argument developed above, namely that particular regions are propitious for both nurturing 
politicians like Nemtsov, while also serving as hubs of democratic resilience attracting 
“refugees” with high moral and political principle from more democratically “hostile” 
national or regional environments.  I have noted already that in the imperial period, territories 
forming part of what is now Yaroslavl’ region were at the very top of imperial Russia’s 
literacy achievers, next only to Moscow and St. Petersburg and surrounding districts now in 
the Moscow and Leningrad oblasti; the scholars Nikolay Petrov and A. Mukhin note that 
already in the 18
th
 century, Yaroslavl was imperial Russia’s major industrial centre.  In the 
early 1990s, they note, “Yaroslavl’ became a second after N. Novgorod Mecca for foreigners, 
the showcase of reforms of provincial Russia”; and a “bastion of democracy” (Petrov and 
Mukhin 1998, pp. 993, 995).  As Putin consolidated power and sought to undermine regional 
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political pluralism by subordinating regional assemblies to loyalists affiliated with the pro-
Kremlin United Russia party, Yaroslavl surprised even seasoned observers of regional 
politics by electing an opposition-supported candidate Yevgeniy Urlashov. Urlashov boasted 
a law degree from Yaroslavl University, one of the country’s oldest higher educational 
establishments and a successor to the Demidov School of Higher Sciences (Demidovskoye 
uchilishche vysshikh nauk) founded in 1803 during the reign of Alexander I.  Nemtsov would 
subsequently courageously publicly defend Urlashov when he became subject to politically-
motivated prosecution.  Alexander Kynev, a leading expert on regional electoral politics 
referred to Ulrashov’s victory as among “the most stunning successes of the opposition in 
regional and local elections in Russia in recent years.”9 Other commentators likewise singled 
out Yaroslavl’ as an unusual example of how “the opposition, by uniting forces and 
capabilities, may not just calmly, but convincingly win in the elections—here, in Putin’s 
Russia, now, in the first year of Putin’s third term.”10  It is in Yaroslavl’ in 2013, that 
Nemtsov likewise impressed observers of regional politics by winning one seat in the 
regional assembly as lead candidate from The Party of People’s Freedom, formerly 
Republican Party of Russia (RPR-PARNAS) declaring that “the freeing of the country from 
swindlers and thieves will start here in Yaroslavl”; and that “the dismembering of the Putin 
regime will start at the regional level.”11  
   
Discussion 
 
The account presented above alerts us to the phenomenon of inter-temporal reproduction of 
particular regional societal microcosms that have endured decades of communist rule and 
continue to survive under the current authoritarian system. Where, then, does the agency of a 
transformational leader like Boris Nemtsov fit into this account?  The concept of 
appropriation introduced earlier in the essay is useful here because it highlights how 
rationalist and adaptive impulses can dictate accommodation to a new regime by members of 
the past order that one would not expect to embrace the new regime. There remains, however, 
                                                 
9
 Alexander Kynev, “Voyna i mir: Prichiny i posledstviya ataki na Yevgeniya Urlashova,” Forbes (Russia) 4 
July 2013. http://www.forbes.ru/mneniya-column/vertikal/241665-voina-i-mer-prichiny-i-posledstviya-ataki-na-
evgeniya-urlashova (accessed 23 December 2015). 
10
 Stanislav Belkovskiy, “Net vybora, krome vyborov,” MKRU, 5 April 2012,  
http://www.mk.ru/politics/2012/04/05/689843-net-vyibora-krome-vyiborov.html (accessed 23 December 2015). 
11
 “Boris Nemtsov ofitsial’no stal deputatom Yaroslavskoy obldumy,” FederalPress, 25 September 2013. 
http://fedpress.ru/news/polit_vlast/news_polit/1380081577-boris-nemtsov-ofitsialno-stal-deputatom-
yaroslavskoi-obldumy (accessed 23 December 2015). 
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a minority, that will resist such impulses. As noted in this discussion, many educated 
members of the tsarist regime ended up joining the communist party, some even becoming 
true believers in the process.  Likewise, we observe how many a prominent perestroika-era 
democrat or democratic commentator has now morphed into a tacit or even active and vocal 
apologist for the Putin regime.  Fear, survival instincts, or perhaps a genuine change of 
political orientation would perhaps account for the remarkable metamorphosis of an 
apparently democratic leader into an endorser of Putin’s political propaganda; or a former 
liberal TV commentator into a host of a kitsch show on TV Rossiya. 
 I have noted how some social/ professional strata—even under a far more 
ideologically-indoctrinated and repressive—soviet—environment than the one found in 
present-day Russia—had been more likely to resist such forms of appropriation, and that 
perhaps an element of self-selection may have been at work in that those most principled and 
independent-minded would have navigated their way into a safe haven of sanity and moral 
integrity. Together, these individuals constitute the moral core of an apparently demoralised 
society, and represent the hope for change.  Here it is appropriate to remind ourselves of the 
long-forgotten polemic between Seymour Martin Lipset and Richard Dobson, on the one 
hand, and Martin Mailia, on the other. Writing in the early 1970s, at the height of 
Communism in Russia, Lipset and Dobson sought to identify the common features shared by 
the non-conformist academic milieus in contexts as diverse as the United States and the 
Soviet Union. From amongst the educated strata, they distinguish specifically the “critical 
intelligentsia.”  They write:  
 
The critical intelligentsia is composed of those who not only have the ability to 
manipulate symbols with expertise, but who have also gained a reputation for 
commitment to general values and who have a broad evaluative outlook derived from 
such commitment. The characteristic orientation of these “generalizing intellectuals” is 
a critically evaluative one, a tendency to appraise in terms of general conceptions of the 
desirable, ideal conceptions which are thought to be universally applicable. Such 
generalizing intellectuals have been described by Lewis Coser as follows: Intellectuals 
exhibit in their activities a pronounced concern with the core values of society. They 
are the men who seek to provide moral standards and to maintain meaningful general 
symbols . . . Intellectuals are men who never seem satisfied with things as they are, 
with appeals to custom and usage. They question the truth of the moment in terms of 
higher and wider truth; they counter appeals to factuality by invoking the “impractical 
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ought.” They consider themselves special custodians of abstract ideas like reason and 
justice and truth, jealous guardians of moral standards that are too often ignored in the 
market place and the houses of power. 
Lipset and Dobson identify America’s and the USSR’s leading centres of academic research 
as the repositories and the producers of the critical intellectual. In the USSR, some examples 
of such hubs that they find notable in particular are the Moscow area towns of Dubna and 
Obninsk, and the science town, the Akademgorodok in Novosibirsk, with its over twenty 
specialised scientific institutions.  Even within America’s top institutions, they argue, one 
finds those with an instinct to conserve the status quo. So it is also with Soviet centres of 
scientific innovation where the mediocre not unfrequently labour alongside the brilliant and 
the critical-minded. Nevertheless, it is within such leading spatial clusters of the production 
of knowledge that Lipset and Dobson saw strong potential for the germination of values 
ultimately corrosive of the Soviet regime. “While such settlements may serve to isolate 
scientists and scholars from the rest of the population, they also seem to afford a fertile 
setting for the gestation of critical thought, and they clearly pose new obstacles to the party's 
persistent efforts to maintain ideological controls,” they write (p. 161). In a response to Lipset 
and Dobson’s essay, Malia begged to disagree.  The natural sciences, he argued, could be 
indeed singled out for relative non-conformism against the overall background of the “flat 
quality of Soviet intellectual life” (p. 214). Yet, the critical intellectual who, like Andrei 
Sakharov, would dare to challenge the political system appears in Malia’s essay as more of an 
exception, not the rule in Soviet research establishments, while the picture of the general 
structure of USSR academia is presented in his essay as one that arguably discourages the 
germination of the kinds of critical faculties that may be characteristic of centres of research 
and innovation in some other settings. 
 History, of course, proved Lipset and Dobson’s observations to be more prophetic 
than those of Malia’s.  Not only did many academic intellectuals contribute to the 
democratisation—and ultimate collapse—of the Soviet system (Brown 1996), but, as any 
scholar of post-Soviet Russian regional politics would testify, it is the regions that had been 
hubs of knowledge production like Novosibirsk, Nizhniy, or St. Petersburg that have 
consistently ranked high in democratic ratings over the last twenty five years, and therefore 
could be considered as possessing latent potential for confronting the national political 
regime much like the science towns did during the Soviet period.  
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 What is particularly important about the observations of Lipset and Dobson, and 
indeed those of Malia when he discusses the origins of the Russian intelligentsia, is the 
emphasis on the “pronounced concern with the core values of society,” rather than on the 
production of new knowledge per se.  By many accounts, Nemtsov had been a first rate 
scientist.
12
  As vividly described by his press-secretary, he was no book-worm though, and 
not someone who could anchor his polemics in high-brow philosophical, literary, or ethics 
debates (Dubovaya 2015).  His political biography however is testimony to consistency in 
adherence to high principle and code of conduct in that he continued to be a democrat long 
when it ceased to be fashionable, expedient, lucrative, and safe. Nemtsov’s life and political 
engagement is of course that of the un-appropriated—of the Soviet scientific intelligentsia 
that inherited the high moral credentials of its imperial antecedents—relatively immune to the 
pressures of daily reaffirmations of ideological dogma; and, later, during the times of 
Putinism, that of an almost quixotic figure, a romantic adhering to principles so at odds with 
the prevailing environment. 
 I have chosen to take a broad-brush historical approach to explain how historically, 
because of their advanced levels of human capital development, some regions of Russia have 
tended to become both producers of the intelligentsia in the highest sense of the term, but also 
to attract—as refuge-seekers from other regions—the non-conformist, the sceptic, and the 
critical-minded.  Putin’s federal recentralization drive, his neglect of Russia’s research and 
academic establishments, and the cultivation of an atmosphere of intolerance for political 
dissent are gradually chipping away at what remains of the “custodians” of high moral 
principle. Will such islands of democratic obstinacy survive in Russia?  If the record of the 
decades of resilience of regional hubs of human capital that strides the imperial and 
communist periods is any guide, I would answer that question in the affirmative.  Yet, we 
also know that it would take the agency of a new Boris Nemtsov to inspire and mobilise these 
latent forces. 
 
  
  
 
  
     
                                                 
12“Nuzhen pamyatnik Borisu Nemtsovu,” Radio Svoboda, 7 April 2015. 
http://www.svoboda.org/content/transcript/26942688.html (accessed 3 July 2015). 
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Appendix: Table 1. Regional democracy (Petrov-Titkov composite score for 1991-2001) 
and imperial-era literacy, 1897 census. Note: Regions are sorted based on highest-to-
lowest democracy scores. 
Region Democracy, 1991-01 Literacy Female Literacy 
St. Petersburg 45 62.6 51.5 
Sverdlovskaya 43 19.2 10.8 
Karelia 41 25.3 10 
Perm 41 19.2 10.8 
Nizhniy Novgorod 40 22 11.1 
Arkhangelsk 37 23.3 11.7 
Irkutsk 37 15.2 7.6 
Novosibirsk 37 10.4 4.3 
Samara 37 22.1 14.1 
Yaroslavl 37 36.2 24 
Chelyabinsk 34 20.4 11.4 
Volgograd 34 23.8 13.6 
Krasnoyarsk 33 13.6 6.7 
Sakhalin 33 26.8 12.5 
Udmurtia 33 16 7.5 
Leningradskaya 32 55.1 43.8 
Vologda 32 19.1 6.7 
Chuvashiya 31 17.9 11.1 
Kostroma 31 24 12.3 
Buryatiya 30 13.4 3.8 
Moscow (City) 30 56.3 42.3 
Murmansk 30 23.3 11.7 
Novgorod 30 23 10.7 
Tyumen 30 11.3 5 
Ivanovo 29 27 13.4 
Kaluga 29 19.4 8.6 
Kamchatka 29 24.7 8.2 
Khakassiya 29 13.6 6.7 
Kirov 29 16 7.5 
Moscow (Obl.) 29 40.2 25.5 
Omsk 29 10.4 4.3 
Tomsk 29 10.4 4.3 
Vladimir 29 27 13.4 
Altai (Rep.) 28 10.4 4.3 
Astrakhan 28 15.5 8.1 
Belgorod 28 16.3 6.6 
Bryansk 28 17.6 7.3 
Kemerovo 28 10.4 4.3 
Mariy El 28 16 7.5 
Tver 28 24.5 11.9 
Komi 27 23.3 11.7 
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Lipetsk 27 16.6 6.9 
Pskov 27 14.6 7.2 
Ryazan 27 20.3 8.2 
Smolensk 27 17.3 7.1 
Amur 26 24.8 11.9 
Krasnodar 26 16.8 6.6 
Magadan 26 24.8 11.9 
Orenburg 26 20.4 11.4 
Saratov 26 23.8 13.6 
Tambov 26 16.6 6.9 
Tula 26 20.7 8.9 
Altay (Kray) 25 10.4 4.3 
Chita 25 13.4 3.8 
Khabarovskiy 25 24.8 11.9 
Penza 25 14.7 6.3 
Stavropol 25 14.4 6.2 
Voronezh 25 16.3 6.4 
Dagestan 24 9.2 2.5 
Karachaevo-Cherkessiya 24 16.8 6.6 
Kurgan 24 11.3 5 
Rostov 24 22.4 9.8 
Jewish 23 24.8 11.9 
Primorskiy 23 24.7 8.2 
Tatarstan 23 17.9 11.1 
Adygeya 22 16.8 6.6 
Ulyanovsk 22 15.6 6.6 
Kursk 21 16.3 6.6 
Mordovia 21 14.7 6.3 
Orel 21 17.6 7.3 
Sakha 21 4.1 1.7 
North Ossetia 19 12.7 6 
Bashkortostan 18 16.7 11.7 
Chukotka 17 24.7 8.2 
Kabardino-Balkariya 17 12.7 6 
Ingushetiya 15 12.7 6 
Kalmykiya 14 15.5 8.1 
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